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Capital Formation and Competitiveness 
Many analysts have cited the slowdown in 
U.5. productivity growth -and the related 
slowdown in capital formation -as  a major 
source of  the decline in the nation's competi-
tive position in the world marketplace. Ac-
cordingtothis view, the nation could haltthe 
deterioration in its international competitive 
position by promoting greater personal sav-
ings and hence a higher level of capital for-
mation, so that the ensuing rise in labor 
productivity would stimulate U.S. exports 
while reducing its imports. In the process, the 
productivity gain would alleviate unemploy-
ment by preventing the loss of American jobs 
to foreign workers. In espousing these poli-
cies, observers have argued that the U.5. 
shou Id emu I  ate the performance of  Germany 
and Japan-two countries which (supposed-
ly) have maintained high rates of capital 
formation, and thus have promoted job cre-
ation through enhanced export performance. 
But the Japanese and German advantage is 
not so clear-cut as sometimes believed. In 
particular, the purported relationship be-
tween capital formation and competitiveness 
has been less robust than claimed. A review 
of U.5. economic performance relative to 
Japan and Germany may, therefore, help 
correct certain misconceptions on this score, 
and thereby help improve policy formation in 
the 1980s. 
Savings comparisons 
Many critics have cited a reduced willing-
ness to save as an important factor behind 
the deterioration in the U.S. competitive 
position. Indeed, the U.S. personal-savings 
rate-the ratio of  savings to disposable in-
come-averaged less than 7 percent in the 
1970s. In contrast, the German and Japanese 
savings rates averaged 14 percent and 20 
percent, respectively-and in fact increased 
over the decade, whereas the U.S. rate fell 
below its historic norm in the last half-
decade~ Surprisingly, the increases in Ger-
man and Japanese personal savings rates 
went hand-in-hand with increases in the la-
bor share of national income. This is surpris-
ing because, supposedly, property-income 
recipients normally save proportionately 
more than do wage earners. 
Critics sometimes attribute this difference in 
savings behavior to alleged weaknesses in the 
American character, but there are more ob-
vious economic reasons to account for the 
difference. One such factor is the tax ad-
vantage bestowed on Americans who own, 
rather than rent, their homes. But in addition, 
Americans are much more likely to invest in 
home purchases than their German or  Japan-
ese counterparts, simply on grounds of af-
fordability-U.5. homes are priced much 
lower when measured in relation to lifetime 
earnings. 
Moreover, the U.S. savings rate has actually 
been quite respectable after adjustment for 
the capital gains accruing from home-price 
appreciation. On that basis, the U.S. savings 
rate remained stable, at more than 13 per-
cent, between 1975 and 1978, whereas the 
official measure showed a decline over that 
period, from 8.6 percent to 5.2 percent. Yet 
while Americans may perceive the apprecia-
tion of their homes as part of  their personal 
savings, these "savings" are nonetheless not 
available for productive investments. 
Capital formation and productivity 
It should be emphasized that household sav-
ings represent only a portion of  total private 
savings available for investment. A more suit-
able measure is gross private savings, which 
includes not-only personal savings but also 
retained earnings of corporations plus depre-
ciation of  both business and household assets 
(the latter reflecting mainly depreciation of 
owner-occupied homes). Between the two 
decades, gross private savings as a proportion 
of gross domestic product (GOP) remained 
fairly stable for all three countries-but at 
much higher levels for Germany and Japan 
than for the U.S. IF\~(dJ~rf©\ll  ~~~~rf\'J~ 
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On the basis of  these higher reported savings 
rates, we wou  Id expect that Germany and 
Japan would outperform the U.S. in terms of 
capital formation and labor productivity. And 
indeed, in the past decade, the ratio of gross 
private fixed capital formation to total output 
averaged 23 percent in Germany and 25 per-
cent inJapan-well above the U.s. ratio of 15 
percent. Reflecting this higher level of capital 
formation, labor productivity increased at 
average annual rates of 3.4 percent and 4.5 
percent in Germany and Japan, respective-
ly-compared with the U.S. average annual 
rise of 1.1  percent. (In the manufacturing 
sector, labor productivity registered average 
annual increases of 5.2 percent in Germany, 
7.4 percent in Japan, and 2.4 percent in the 
U.S.) Nonetheless, the trend growth rate in 
the capital/labor ratio fell in all three coun-
tries, leadingto declines in labor productivity 
growth. In relative importance, the declines 
in Germany and Japan stemmed from a bus-
°  iness-investment slowdown, whereas the 
u.s. decline reflected rapid labor-force 
growth. Between the two decades, the annual 
average increase in output per worker-hour 
dropped by 1.0 percentage points in Ger-
many, 5.0 percentage points in Japan, and 0.9 
percentage points in the U.S. 
The business-investment slowdown in both 
Germany and Japan reflected a myriad of 
factors, including an accelerator response of 
investment to changes in output levels. The 
diminished growth in economic activity, 
stemming in part from OPEC price hikes, 
helped account for the fall-off in investment 
expenditures in both Germany and Japan 
during the 1970s. Many would argue, in 
addition, that enlarged fiscal deficits in all 
three countries contributed to reduced in-
vestment outlays. The ratio of  the public-
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) to GNP 
reached 2.8 percent in Germany, 2.7 percent 
in the U.S., and more than 9 percent in Japan 
in the 1970-79 period-considerably above 
the average of  the 1960s in each case. Be-
cause of  this "crowding out" of private in-
vestment, all three countries experienced, in 
varying degrees, a capital spending slow-
2 
down in the 1970s. Butthere is an alternative 
argument -fiscal authorities in all three 
countries simply acted in response to de-
pressed business conditions and slack in-
vestment activity during the 1970s. From this 
perspective, the widening of the public-
sector borrowing requirement was a conse-
quence, and not a cause, of reduced invest-
ment activity. 
Productivity and competitiveness 
Whatever the source ofthe declines in private 
business investment and labor productivity, 
there is a clear association between the two. 
The question that now needs to be addressed 
is whether or notthe lower labor-productivity 
growth in the U.S., relative to Germany and 
Japan, has led to reduced international com-
petitiveness. We should note, however, that 
higher labor-productivity growth and its ben-
eficial effects on competitiveness may be 
more than offset by higher nominal wage 
settlements. 
In fact, hourly compensation in manufactur-
ing from 1970 to 1979 increased at annual 
rates of 14.5 percent in Japan and 10.9 per-
cent in Germany, significantly higherthan the 
8.3 percent recorded in the u.s. over the 
same period. As a result, labor costs per unit 
of manufacturing output rose faster in Japan 
than in either Germany or the U.s., despite 
the higher productivity growth of  Japanese 
workers (see chart). Any relationship be-
tween labor productivity growth and cost 
competitiveness is almost totally over-
whelmed by the more moderate wage de-
mands of American workers compared with 
their German and Japanese counterparts. 
Of  course, these cost comparisons implicitly 
assume that changes in the prices of raw 
materials are the same across cou  ntries. U nti I 
recently, the unwillingness ofthe U.S. to 
allow the domestic price of oil to rise to the 
world-market price would have provided 
domestic firms a competitive edge. But more 
importantly, these costs are measured in 
domestic currency units. The depreciation of 
the dollar against the Japanese and German currencies duringthe 1970s should have 
greatly enhanced the cost competitiveness of 
American firms in world markets. Between 
1970 and 1980, the German mark nearly 
doubled in value vis-a-vis the dollar, whereas 
the Japanese yen rose by two-thirds against 
the American currency, leading to a tripling 
of  German qnd Japanese unit labor costs, 
measured in U.S. dollars. This compares with 
a 66-percent rise in U.S. unit labor costs over 
the same period (see chart). 
Consistent with these movements in costs, 
the price competitiveness of U.S. manufac-
turers improved during the 1970s, as mea-
su red by the ratio of  U.S. to foreign wholesale 
prices, adjusted for trade-weighted changes 
in exchange rates. According to this measure, 
the prices of u.s. manufactured goods in the 
1970s fell by 13 percent against foreign-
goods prices denominated in U.S. dollars. 
Partly as a result, the volume of U.S. manu-
factu red exports rose by 86 percent from 
1970 to 1979, while import volume in-
creased by 70 percent. Overthe same period, 
Japanese import growth roughly matched 
export growth, while the volume of German 
imports rose faster than exports by a differ-
ence of 33 percent. 
Competitive factors 
Why, then, is it sometimes maintained that 
American industries have difficulty meeting 
the test of foreign competition? Our export-
volume figures indicate that U.S. manufactur-
ing in the aggregate has met the test, despite 
some well-publicized exceptions to the rule. 
The popular impression of deteriorating U.S. 
competitiveness is not  supported by the facts. 
That impression is based either on out-dated 
information pertainingto a period of  an over-
valued u.s. dollar, or on partial information 
pertaining to certain industries and not to 
others. 
These conclusions should not be interpreted 
as arguments against a policy of promoting 
incentives for personal savings and capital 
spending. Indeed, higher productivity growth 
resulting from greater capital accumulation 
should certainly lead to increased real wages 
and, hence, improved living standards for 
U.S workers. 
Kenneth Bernauer 
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3 BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,100  5.9 
8,093  7.0 
2,322  6.8 
6,429  14.4 
- 889  - 3.6 
187  17.8 
- 238  3.4 
245  1.6 
3,010  - 7.1 
- 2,825  9.3 
1,373  4.9 
17,563  29.4 
16,823  32.9 
8,379  39.1 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Qaily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed (  -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





2/18/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  9 
119  126 
n.a.  135 
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